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Summary 
 In this paper I suggest a network-based typology of favours that seeks to 
reflect their substantive ambivalence.  
 I argue that a common exchange of favours differs from an ‘economy of 
favours’ in a number of ways. An economy of favours operates on the basis of 
favours of access, originating in the re-distribution of public resources. It can 
also be differentiated by its scale and the magnitude of ambivalence: 
substantive, functional and attitudinal.  
 Firstly, I distinguish substantive ambivalence of favours, determined by the 
degree of uncertainty of obligation in social relations and intermittent display 
of features of gift and commodity exchanges, as well as features of benefiting 
from and investing into creation and maintenance of networks.  
 Secondly, there is functional ambivalence, whereby favours originate from 
certain structural conditions and contradictory demands – they play supportive 
but also subversive roles for the formal and informal constraints that frame 
them.  
 Thirdly, there is attitudinal ambivalence on the part of both individuals and 
governments, relying on economies of favours, but also denying engagement, 
criticizing economies of favours but also accepting them.  
 I suggest a research agenda for the study of economies of favours on the basis 
of three propositions: conceptual innovation, methodological experimentation, 
and challenge of comparison.  
 Yet these novel research agendas stumble upon the conceptual issues of 
ambivalence; methodological difficulties of dealing with open secrets in the 
field; and challenges of comparison of societies’ know-hows.  
 Overcoming these requires some radical re-thinking in conceptual, 
measurement-based and policy-oriented approaches. 
 
 
Introduction: In the beginning was ... blat!
 1
 
My ‘discovery’ of economies of favours started with a study of blat – the use of 
personal networks for getting things done in Russia (Ledeneva 1998). Exchanges of 
favours are somewhat ambiguous and evasive, yet because they are also intrinsic to 
human societies it is essential to analyse them. It is tempting to assume that once 
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favours are defined and analysed, they can be measured, compared and utilised with 
benefit to academic research and policy making. Yet these novel research agendas 
stumble upon the conceptual issues of ambivalence; methodological difficulties of 
dealing with open secrets in the field; and challenges of comparison of societies’ 
know-hows. Overcoming these requires some radical re-thinking in conceptual, 
measurement-based and policy-oriented approaches. 
For the majority of my respondents, blat means different things in different 
contexts, irreducible to a common ground: blat is an acquaintance or friend through 
whom you can obtain some goods and services in short supply, cheaper or better 
quality. It is a reciprocal relationship which people call ‘I scratch your back, you 
scratch mine.’ Blat is about pulling strings and creating and maintaining informal 
networks, based on mutual sympathy and trust among friends, acquaintances, or 
occasional contacts. Blat takes place in conditions of rationing and where one fixes a 
job for another, or where, on otherwise equal conditions, the one who is known or 
recommended gets chosen. Sometimes blat means influence and protection, all kinds 
of patrons, ‘umbrellas’ and ‘roofs’ (kryshi), as well as their recommendations and 
introductions. The plurality of favours, their (ir)regularity, kind of relationship 
between the parties, type of need, regime of reciprocity, participation of an 
intermediary or broker makes blat favours almost irreducible to any clear-cut 
typology. Rather, these situations are tied together in the way which is best grasped by 
the notion of ‘family likeness’ or ‘family resemblance’ enunciated by Wittgenstein in 
his Philosophical Grammar (written in 1931-1933, first published in 1969: 75, 118) 
and developed in the Blue Book (1958, hereafter BB). Entities which we commonly 
subsume under a general term, Wittgenstein writes, need not have anything in 
common: 
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They form a family the members of which have family likeness. Some of them 
have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way 
of walking; and these likenesses overlap. The idea of a general concept being a 
common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, 
too simple, ideas of the structure of language (BB 17, see also BB 87, 124, PI 
1,67). 
Such ambivalence, whereby ‘family resemblances’ might or might not be available in 
every particular blat situation but altogether can be associated with the use of blat 
seems to be essential for grasping the elusive nature of an exchange of favours.
2
 In its 
most extended sense, sociological ambivalence, in the definition of Robert Merton, 
refers to incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour. The 
incompatibility is assigned to a status and the social structures that generate the 
circumstances in which ambivalence is embedded (Merton 1976: 6-7). Merton’s 
analysis of sociological ambivalence stems from Sorokin’s repeated statement that 
actual social relations are predominantly of one type or another, rather than 
comprising pure types, and points out that “it is precisely the matter of not confining 
our attention to the dominant attributes of a role or social relation that directs us to the 
function and structure of sociological ambivalence” (Merton 1976: 16). The core type 
of sociological ambivalence puts contradictory demands upon the occupants of a 
status in a particular social relation. And since these norms cannot be simultaneously 
expressed in behaviour, they come to be expressed in an oscillation of behaviours: of 
detachment and compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and 
impersonal treatment” (Merton 1976: 8). In these terms, favours are outcomes of 
social relations, defined by the oscillating occurrence of compassion, permissiveness 
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and preferential treatment of insiders, and of detachment, discipline and impersonal 
treatment of outsiders. For a transaction to be a favour, it should deviate from norm 
(“beyond what is due or usual”) and should not imply a rigid obligation (to give, to 
receive, and most importantly, to reciprocate) or certainty (Oxford dictionary: favour). 
I define favour as an ambivalent transaction of sharing, transferring, or redistributing 
(im)material resources for (im)material gain, aimed at maintaining (or creating) social 
relations.  
I suggest a network-centred typology of favours that seeks to reflect their 
substantive ambivalence. The ideal types of favours, pictured towards the margins of 
the diagram, are determined by whether a favour is provided from personal/private or 
re-distributed/public resources, and by the type of incentives that the parties (see 
Figure 1). The ambivalence of favour(s) – I use plural to emphasise this – is pictured 
towards the centre of the diagram as intermittently displaying features of gift, 
endowment, investment and commodity (see the circle and arrows on Figure 1). The 
nature of a favour, given or received, tends to be ambivalent, as the giver, the 
receiver, and the observer cannot help but perceive its meaning, value and functions 
differently. Where the boundaries between the public and the private and between the 
moral and material gain are not clearly defined, favours are particularly difficult to 
categorise. For example, time, inclusion into a network, or power of decision-making, 
commonly transferred in favour transactions, are seemingly non-material resources 
that are given by a person but they are not fully private, and are often given at the 
expense of other potential recipients. 
Figure 1. 
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Now that the favour is conceptualised and typologised, let us specify conditions under 
which economies of favours consolidate and establish the limits of the phenomenon. 
Just as occasional unreciprocated favour may become reciprocated and even develop 
into a regular exchange, an exchange of favours, under certain conditions, can develop 
into an ‘economy of favours,’ essential for the functioning of political, economic and 
social system. I argue that a simple exchange of favours differs from an ‘economy of 
favours’ by its scale and the magnitude of ambivalence: substantive, functional and 
attitudinal. Firstly, I distinguish substantive ambivalence of favours, determined by 
the degree of uncertainty of obligation in social relations and intermittent display of 
features of gift and commodity exchanges, as well as features of benefiting from and 
investing into networks. Secondly, there is functional ambivalence, whereby favours 
derive from certain structural conditions and play supportive but also subversive roles 
for the formal and informal constraints that frame them. Thirdly, there is attitudinal 
ambivalence on the part of both individuals and governments, relying on economies 
of favours, but also denying engagement, criticizing economies of favours but also 
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accepting them. Although some of these features may apply to favours in every 
society, it is the combination of all three – substantive, functional and attitudinal 
ambivalence – that distinguishes and under certain political-economic and socio-
historic constraints necessitates the consolidation of ‘economy of favours’.  
 In what follows I sum up the key features of economies favours in 
postsocialist contexts – their nature and functions, conditions and implications, as 
deducted  from blat, Russia’s ‘economy of favours’ – and consider applying the 
‘economy of favours’ perspective to other societies. I suggest a research agenda for 
the study of economies of favours on the basis of three propositions: conceptual 
innovation, methodological experimentation, and challenge of comparison. I raise my 
concerns, or points of self-critique, with regard of this agenda: no concept can 
perfectly reflect the substantive ambivalence of the economies of favours; their 
functional ambivalence is difficult to pin down and measure; the cultural and temporal 
relativity of specific exchanges is impossible to compare; the attitudinal ambivalence 
(misrecognition) is hard to work with in the field; and societies’ know-hows 
associated with economies of favours do not lend themselves easily to policy-making.  
 
Substantive ambivalence of favours  
An exchange of favours represents a specific type of non-monetary exchange that is 
ambivalent in nature, as it has resemblance to both gift and commodity exchange as 
well as a range of other practices (Ledeneva 1996; 1998). An exchange of favours can 
be both asymmetrical as a gift (a mother looks after her daughter’s child or lends 
jewellery to wear; neighbour A walks B’s dog together with one’s own) and 
symmetrical as in barter or commodity exchange (A walks neighbour B’s dog, while 
B looks after A’s flat during business trips). Due to their ambivalent nature, favours 
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are hard to locate on a Sahlin’s ‘continuum’, or a ‘spectrum’ of reciprocities, “ranging 
from pure gift … to barter and theft which are each an attempt to get something for 
nothing with impunity” (Sahlins 1972). In certain circumstances favours resemble 
gift, as characterised by reciprocal dependence, which engenders regard for and trust 
in the other over the long-term. Gregory claims that such reciprocal dependence is 
inherent in gift, thus creating its ‘inalienability’, as opposed to reciprocal 
independence and ‘alienability’ of commodity (Gregory 1982). I see both as present, 
in an ambivalent form, in favour. On the one hand, exchanges of favours merge with 
patterns of care and sociability to such an extent that people are often unable to 
distinguish, for example, friendship from the use of friendship. Among family and 
friends, favours are not necessarily exchanges. Their moral value is derived from not 
being reciprocated, though reciprocal considerations can emerge when the 
relationship is broken (Boltanski 1990).
3
 On the other hand, favours can also resemble 
commodity exchange, “with those balanced reciprocities in which social conventions 
stipulate returns of commensurate worth or utility within a finite and a narrow period” 
(Sahlins 1972). I argue that in the case of an economy of favours, where favours are 
routinely given and received, an exchange of favours tends to adopt an ambivalent 
form, that is displaying features of both gift and commodity in a contradictory and 
mutually exclusive way. Let us consider an example. A neighbour looks after an 
elderly actress, who lives by herself, only occasionally being visited by relatives and 
not receiving enough support from them. The neighbour’s help is selfless, she admires 
the former celebrity, yet she is also resentful towards her lousy relatives, not picking 
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up the cost of a permanent carer, whose functions she effectively performs.
4
 The 
concept of ‘favour’ implies this duality in the sense in which gift (among us) and 
commodity (among them) do not and remains ambivalent due to the fluid nature of 
contexts and relationships. 
 In gift exchange, inalienable objects of the same kind pass between people 
already bound together by social ties, whilst in commodity exchange, alienable 
objects of different kinds pass between people acting as free agents. Gift exchange 
underwrites social relationships and facilitates social reproduction; commodity 
exchange establishes relationship between things and ensures reproduction of the 
latter (Gregory 1982). An exchange of favours is ambivalent. In our example of blat 
exchange, although favours certainly transferred alienable objects, it did so on the 
condition that the relationship already exists. As in gift exchange, the repayment of 
favours took time, and there existed a period of unfulfilled obligation between 
economic transfers, which in aggregate perpetuated the system (Malinowski 1961 
(1922): 177-94). Since reciprocity was a moral obligation (i.e. an informal 
arrangement), repayments were not properly accounted for. This led to uncertainty 
about whether a debt had been cleared, which led to a continuing obligation, which in 
turn ensured the system’s survival (Mauss 1990 (1925); Gouldner 1977). ‘The other’ 
was not only functional but also personal. The favours therefore bore, as it were, a 
non-alienable character. Economies of favours could deliver commodities, such as 
foodstuffs, consumer durables, services, health care, but did so in a personalised, 
compassionate, and warm fashion that made them marked by the personal stamp of 
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 RTR-Planeta, A show on the loneliness of the elderly, with Tatiana Samoilova, a Soviet movie star, 
Oscar for Letyat Zhuravli, who called to say that she only has 100 roubles in her pocket.    
 9 
the donor.
5
  This could be best imagined as the occasional borrowing of a friend’s or a 
gatekeeper’s resources, while the access itself remained unalienable.  
 In socialist societies, the boundaries between relationship and the use of 
relationship became particularly blurred. Where money does not work fully and the 
currency of exchange is favours of access, favours are normally provided at the 
expense of the public resources and serve to compensate for the deficiencies of the 
centralised system of distribution. Blat favours were commonly aimed at obtaining 
food, goods and services to which people were entitled. It made such favours easier to 
receive. Moreover, the sense of entitlement provided legitimacy to those involved in 
giving, receiving or exchanging favours. Those who did not or could not become 
involved, however, emphasized the inequality and unfairness of blat. 
 It is possible to establish a heuristic criterion to distinguish between friendship 
and blat (the use of friendship) – if a help to a friend comes from one’s own pocket, it 
is help of a friend, if a help to a friend comes at the expense or through redistribution 
of public resources, it is a favour of access. Providing a ‘favour of access’ comes 
dangerously close to a corrupt transaction (the use of public office for private gain), 
yet the giver can deny it on the basis of an altruistic motive or absence of private gain. 
The difference between a favour of access and a commodity received in a corrupt 
exchange is defined not only by the nature of resources but also by the nature of gain 
– selfless re-distribution of public funds for a moral cause is not likely to be seen as 
corrupt. Selflessness of favours is an essential feature of an economy of favours: ‘I 
favour your interests, you favour mine, and we are both selfless and non-interested in 
material gain individuals.’ Claiming to act for non-material and/or non-personal gain 
allows the giver not to cross the line of corrupt exchanges, while the recipient of 
                                                 
5
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shows up with the actress’s favourite pies.   
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material gain is not in the position to re-direct public resources and technically does 
nothing wrong. The lack of private property rights or clear divisions between the 
public and the private in socialist societies provides fertile ground for an economy of 
favours to flourish.   
As opposed to favours given, received or exchanged at the expense of personal 
resources, an economy of favours implies that a favour-giver is not as much a giver as 
a gate-keeper or a broker benefiting from the position of access and discretionary 
powers. It also implies that a favour-recipient is a beneficiary of a re-distributed 
object or service, delivered by a friend, a friend of a friend or a broker, that the 
recipient might be entitled to have. For example, when one is given internship or a job 
as a favour, once transacted, the favour becomes invisible, while the internship/ job 
appear to be or become legitimate outcomes. In other words, favours do not produce 
an outcome visibly different from the outcome received in other ways, at least not in 
the mode of ‘one composed of many’ synthesis, where thesis and antithesis are 
combined or synthesised into a certain outcome that is new or different from both 
constituent parts.
6
 Rather, favours operate in the mode of ambivalence, whereby ‘one 
of many’ is concurrent with another (or can even be contradictory to) ‘one of many’, 
where the outcome is not different from one of the constituent options, but is fairly 
hard to achieve and to predict (due to internal and external constraints).  
 To sum up the discussion of the ambivalent nature of the exchange of favours, 
how does the norm of reciprocity – a ‘mutually satisfying pattern of exchanging goods 
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synthesis, and by the necessity of oscillating behaviour (Merton 1976). 
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and services’ (Gouldner 1977: 28) – differ from gift exchange and commodity 
exchange? If the fundamental condition for the reproduction of gift exchange is an a 
priori existing relationship and reciprocal dependence (strong ties); and commodity 
exchange requires a priori existing market and reciprocal independence (no ties); the 
reproduction of the exchange of favours, as an ideal type, requires operational 
networks (whether strong ties, weak ties or networking to avoid the ‘no ties’ situation) 
that can be used for extracting a market value out of the relationship. As in other types 
of exchange, people expect reciprocation in return for a favour, believe that in the 
long run exchange will balance out and that not reciprocating will lead to penalties 
(Gouldner 1977: 28-43). It is hard to depict the ambivalence on favours schematically, 
as illustrated by arrows in Figure 1. The sustainability of the economy of favours, 
however, draws on their ambivalence – genuinely recognised as help, disinterested 
giving or kindness, and misrecognised as a value-creating transaction. There is also 
certain moral ambiguity inherent in favours provided at the expense of non-private 
resources – what comes to be seen as ‘corruption’ or amoral behaviour from the 
outsider’s perspective might be viewed more benignly by those engaged in it, 
especially if does not involve straightforward bribery. Let us consider further issues 
around functional and attitudinal ambivalence of favours. 
  
  Functional ambivalence of favours 
One of the key conditions for an exchange of favours to become an economy 
of favours is summed up in a popular proverb “do not have 100 roubles, have hundred 
friends,” that emphasized that favours can give what money can’t buy (Sandel 2012). 
In the planned economy money has played a little role, because of the underdeveloped 
markets, but in developed markets there are also things that money cannot buy. 
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Whether driven by scarcity or surplus, there are pockets of society where friends, 
friends of friends and other gatekeepers capable of sharing access are all-important, 
and where favours of access are routinely provided and channelled by social 
networks. On the surface of things, it is a ‘network of gatekeepers’ either opening 
their gates when needed for those they care about or using their own time and 
resources for sociability, thus also creating or maintaining networks. The hidden part 
of this sociability is its rationality and the potential of a non-monetary favour to 
generate a return, to create incentives for keeping the gates shut unless there is a 
prospect of a return, and to generate divisions into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ thus entailing 
exclusion and unfairness.
7
  
When gatekeeping is associated with a position in official hierarchy (with 
access to public resources), granting a favour is a transaction defined not only by 
personal choice. It is shaped by the dual pressure on a bureaucrat: on the one hand, 
formal responsibility to perform certain duties and follow rules according to 
organisational or professional code, delegated by the principal, and on the other hand, 
informal responsibility for personal networks, friends, family, and the peer pressure of 
the social circle. A cross-country variation in the combinations of formal and informal 
constraints is substantial. There are societies where it is possible to be a good 
bureaucrat and a good brother at the same time, but there are societies where it is not 
possible and one has to navigate around both sets of constraints in order to keep both 
the job and the network. Economies of favours tend to develop in circumstances of 
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 Favours of access is a concept relevant for regimes with state centralised distribution systems 
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of private financial institutions (the 2008 financial crisis in Russia has certainly put businesses in a 
queue for a bailout). In fully-fledged markets, as portrayed by Jeremy Rifkin (2000), the institution of 
ownership gradually transforms into the life-long access to services, so one can envisage the relevance 
of economies of favours for access to nearly every aspect of human life. 
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conflicting formal and informal constraints, where their ambivalent nature becomes 
instrumental not only for individuals but also for institutions.  
The resemblance of blat favours aimed at circumventing formal rules and 
procedures – manipulating access to resources through direct purchase as in bribery or 
diverting of public resources for personal gain – makes them a member of a wider 
family of informal practices and complicates the matter of drawing the boundaries 
between favours and corrupt exchanges (Ledeneva 1998: 39-59). It also raises the 
question whether blat was in fact a dysfunctional corrupt practice. This may be the 
case in certain contexts but it is also misleading, for neither blat nor corruption have a 
clear or single meaning, nor are these terms independent of normative, context-free 
judgement. According to Lampert (1984: 371), cases of corruption have a ranking 
specific to the society. The Soviets clearly felt that bribery was a worse form of 
corruption than a small scale use of public resources for private ends (such as using 
workers to do private jobs in enterprise time). Cultural connotations of money as 
‘dirty’ made non-monetary transactions fairly legitimate (Humphrey, 2000). This was 
in tune with the distinction drawn between various forms of offence in the Criminal 
Code and the different penalties for engaging in them (Heinzen, 2007). Blat was not 
on the criminal scale at all and could not strictly speaking be characterized as illegal 
(by reason of its small scale or recognized necessity (voiti v polozhenie)), thus falling 
in the category of ‘good’ or ‘ambiguous’ corruption (see also Krastev, 2004). The 
oppressive nature of the communist regime, and its centralized way of distribution of 
good and privileges, introduces another twist in interpretation of the nature of blat 
practices: if blat corrupted the corrupt regime, can we refer to it as corruption? With 
these considerations in mind, to equate blat and corruption in Soviet conditions is to 
misunderstand the nature of Soviet socialism. 
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It is tempting to argue that blat subverted the Soviet system, and thus should 
be held responsible for undermining its principles and foundations leading to the 
ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet this is only one side of the coin. 
Historicizing blat helps to identify its important place in the functioning of socialism 
vis-à-vis patrimonialism and modernity (Ledeneva 2009b). Blat served the needs of 
individuals and the system, and thus supported the socialist system, operating contrary 
to the system's own acclaimed principles. It developed together with the regime and 
reflected its changes: at first there were the basic necessities such as food, jobs and 
living space, helping kulaks to escape exile or making it possible for Bolsheviks to 
christen their babies despite the Party ban on religious rituals; then came the more 
sophisticated needs of late socialism associated with education, mobility and 
consumerism. But although there may seem to be a parallel between the way contacts 
were used in Bolshevik Russia (for example, in order to conceal class origins given 
the constraints of the Bolshevik demand for a proletarian background), and in 
postsocialist Russia (where contacts could make one a millionaire), this is misleading. 
The context – the nature of the regime and its constraints on human behaviour – 
matters most in assessing the functional ambivalence of specific economies of 
favours. Blat generated an alternative currency to compensate for the rigidities of the 
ideology, planned economy and centralised distribution systems; it was as much a 
solution to the defects of the central distribution system of socialism as it was a 
problem.Apart from the ambivalent relationship (subversive/ supportive) with the 
Soviet institutions, blat has produced a similar bearing on personal relationships – 
people were forced to use their personal networks instrumentally but this 
instrumentality also kept the relationship going. The functional uses of networks 
might be interesting to look at as they might lead to the identification of the universal 
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features of economies of favours, defined as the use of networks for getting things 
done.  
 Let us shift the focus from the specific political-economic and socio-historic 
contexts of blat to the universal features of economies of favours. What makes me 
think that economies of favours are functionally ambivalent? It is their embeddedness 
in social networks.  Social networks are intrinsically ambivalent in their functions: it 
would be impossible to decide whether they serve or undermine the structures and the 
individuals. They do both, simultaneously, and can do one only together with the 
other. My ideal types, based on analytical distinctions of strong and weak ties, and 
private and public contexts, in which networks can be used, serve to frame the fluid, 
blurry and fundamentally ambivalent nature of networks. Networks can produce a 
variety of outcomes in their ‘social back-up,’ ‘safety net,’ ‘survival kit,’ and the 
‘weapon of the weak’ functions, corresponding to their downsides:  ‘free-riding,’ 
‘lock-in effect,’ ‘limiting individual rights,’ and ‘path dependency.’ Each function in 
Figure 2 is coupled with its dysfunction illustrating an ambivalence of the outcome 
that networks can produce: back-up/free-riding; safety net/lock-in effect; survival 
kit/limited rights; weapon of the weak/path dependency (Ledeneva 2013: 65).   
 
 
Figure 2. 
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When we interpret this figure for the conditions of Soviet socialism and the economy 
of shortage, for example, the boundaries between the public and the private, between 
weak ties and strong ties are particularly blurry. Correspondingly, sociability of social 
networks and their instrumental use often become blurred. Kin and friends, and in late 
socialism even acquaintances, are expected to provide each other with access to goods 
and services in short supply (a survival kit) and to help out in other ways. Networking 
acquired connotations of the pragmatic use of networks, not necessarily self-serving 
but serving the interests of a network and reducing individual rights (limited rights). 
Along with a social support (back-up function), personal networks also provided 
unauthorized use to family, network or institutional resources, thereby forming 
patterns of parasitism between individuals and institutions, private and public 
domains, society and the state (free-riding).  
There was no Soviet word to denote ‘networks’ or ‘networking’ (a post-Soviet 
term seti is used in academic contexts and in social media). However, idioms related 
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to secure networks in common use are ‘people in one’s circle’ (svoi liudi), ‘one of us’ 
(svoi), and ‘circle of joint responsibility’ (krugovaya poruka), all of which connote an 
exclusive (closed) nature of networks (safety net) and their calculated use (lock-in).  
The networks of gatekeepers, upon which the economies of favours rely, 
operate with such intensity that blat can be effectively thought of as the know-how of 
the Soviet system and the reverse side of its over-controlling centre (the weapon of 
the weak). The way they tackle the economic, political, ideological and social 
pressures of the socialist system effectively meant that the system worked against its 
own proclaimed principles. Yet paradoxically, by subverting the socialist system, the 
networks of gatekeepers also supported it (path dependency). 
The functional ambivalence of Russia’s economy of favours has, to some 
extent, solved the double puzzle in the history of authoritarian regimes: how people 
survived in an economy of shortage, and how the regime survived under similar 
constraint. Moreover, the Soviet case has opened an avenue to explore the nature of 
other political and economic regimes from a new perspective—the perspective of 
economies of favours. In some societies, these are essential for the understanding of 
workings of institutions and networks. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
practices that have replaced blat in the functioning of the political and economic 
institutions of the 1990s have sustained the functional ambivalence by supporting but 
also subverting new post-Soviet institutions (Ledeneva, 2006). Further research is 
needed to establish conditions under which economies of favours are beneficial or 
detrimental for individuals, political regimes and economic markets. The functional 
ambivalence of economies of favours is linked to a number of complex issues, 
associated with their divisive nature (us and them); competitive advantages they offer 
to certain networks but not others, thus implying inequality and unfairness; the 
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compensatory role for the defects of formal institutions while diverting their purpose 
(need and greed); their capacity for mitigating personal and societal changes, reforms 
and crises, while also blocking them. Functional ambivalence is not sufficiently 
researched and understood. Some reasons are linked to intellectual discomfort and 
methodological inadequacy of tackling substantive ambivalence. Others are of 
pragmatic nature: it is difficult to study economies of favours due to the ambivalent 
attitudes to favours of those involved.  
 
Attitudinal ambivalence of favours 
In the context of modernity, ambivalence is associated with the fragmentation 
and the failure of manageability. Zygmunt Bauman defines ambivalence as the 
possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category and views it 
as a language-specific disorder. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort 
we feel when we are unable to read the situation properly and to choose between 
alternative actions (Bauman 1991: 1, 12). Bauman lists ambivalence among the tropes 
of the ‘other’ of order: ambiguity, uncertainty, unpredictability, illogicality, 
irrationality, ambivalence, brought about by modernity with its desire to organise and 
to design (Bauman 1991: 7). Ambivalence thus implies a form of disorder and 
negativity. In Bauman’s list, in my view, ambivalence can be singled out for its bi-
polarity, oscillating duality, and relative clarity of the polar positions. It is a social 
counterpart of emotional ambivalence in psychology (love-hate) or the uncertainty 
principle in physics (semi-conductors), in other words, the lack of synthesis. In 
Bauman’s terms, the ambivalence of favours would be about the linguistic disorder 
and the discomfort of attaching it to a single category (as discussed in the section of 
substantive ambivalence), yet it is also about the linguistic ‘hide-and-seek’ that 
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enables us to read the situation in a self-comforting way, the so-called ‘misrecognition 
game’ (Ledeneva 1998). Functionally, blat favours constitute an alternative currency 
that introduces elements of the market into the planned economy and loosens up the 
rigid constraints of the political and economic regimes. Yet psychologically, 
culturally and practically direct exchanges are not possible. A conceptual idea of 
‘misrecognition’ first formulated by Pierre Bourdieu in his critique of economic or 
objectivist explanations of gift exchange, helps to clarify this point.  
Gift exchange is one of the social games that cannot be played unless the 
players refuse to acknowledge the objective truth of the game, the very truth 
that objective analysis brings to light, and unless they are predisposed to 
contribute, with their efforts, their marks of care and attention, and their time, 
to the production of collective misrecognition (Bourdieu 1990: 105). 
In other words, if gift-givers openly acknowledge that they are involved in 
equivalent exchange, and that they expect something of equivalent value in return, 
this is no longer gift-giving. Such denial, or misrecognition, is essential for the ‘gift-
giving’ to take place. In the case of blat, misrecognition is not collective in the same 
sense. As in gift exchange, misrecognition of blat is common for insiders of the 
favour transaction, who often practise blat while recognising it as ‘helping out.’ From 
the outsider perspective, the deal is recognised as blat. Perpetual switching of 
perspectives enables one to engage in blat practices and at the same time to distance 
oneself from them.  
 Following Bourdieu, I describe a number of strategies by which one can be 
involved in an economy of favours while also misrecognising it (Ledeneva 1998, 59-
72). The intermediation of blat transactions is essential to protect one’s positive and 
altruistic self-image and to misrecognise one’s own experiences: one helps a friend, 
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not oneself, and that friend returns a favour eventually. Both parties maintain a ‘good 
friend’ self-image while using public resources for ‘non-selfish’ purposes. When the 
moral norms prescribe that one must help a friend but also that blat is immoral and 
unethical, the ambivalence in attitudes – the partial ‘misrecognition game’ – is the 
way out. The attitudinal ambivalence serves the situations of moral or logical squeeze 
and helps to deal with the paradoxes of the system, and in this particular case to allow 
personal engagement in blat practices while blaming others engaging in them. “Blat is 
everywhere but what I do is not blat” is the key defensive narrative of individual 
respondents (Ledeneva 1998: 60). At the level of the Soviet system, a satirical 
magazine Krokodil promotes the narrative of the “grand misrecognition game”: when 
one does it – engages in blat and other unofficial practices – it has nothing to do with 
socialism. Although in humorous format, Krokodil could not help being part of the 
political repressive machinery designed to introduce and reinforce moral/political 
standards. Uncovering a form of politics that pretends to be humour reveals a 
dimension of power that Bourdieu referred to as symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991). 
By the 1980s in the Soviet Union, understanding of the formality of 
constraints and of the possibility of circumventing them became almost universal—a 
variety of know-how was shared by insiders of a circle, a network or society as a 
whole. The phrase ‘prohibited, but possible’ (nel’zya, no mozhno) offers a summary 
understanding of Soviet society with its all-embracing restrictions and the labyrinth of 
possibilities around them. Blat exchanges of early socialism have matured into a fully-
fledged economy of favours and become an open secret of late socialism, alongside its 
other competences:  “to read between the lines,” “to see through the façade,” “to beat 
the system”, that enabled the reproduction of daily interactions without pressure of 
recognition of one’s own compromised behaviour or the failures of the system. It 
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allowed people to get on with their daily lives and helped the system to reproduce 
itself. A society of double standards and open secrets was thus formed.    
Although the social competence of handling open secrets and dealing with 
situations of moral ambiguity or ethical squeeze are largely invisible for outsiders, I 
argue that the attitudinal ambivalence can be spotted in what I call a ‘knowing smile’ 
(Ledeneva 2011a), at least I have received many of these while researching the 
economy of favours. Knowing smiles are partially about smiling, partially about 
knowing; partially about knowing, partially also about not knowing but being able to 
go on without questioning. A knowing smile signals the competence that includes a 
certain degree of cynicism, tacit knowledge about what’s normal, the ability ‘to go 
on,’ a skill to turn formal constraints to one’s advantage, and a capacity to play the 
misrecognition game in self-defence and in the defence of the system. It implies 
ambivalence about the idea of being honest, upright, and dedicated to official goals, 
holding these values, while also maintaining a distance from them. “Someone who 
readily believes whatever official discourse says has no independent thought” (Yang 
1994). Independence, individualism, civic rights in totalitarian societies are 
channelled through doublethink. In his classic novel [1984], Orwell defines 
doublethink as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind 
simultaneously:”  
“The Party intellectual knows in which direction his memories must be 
altered; he therefore knows that he is playing tricks with reality; but by the 
exercise of doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is not violated. . . . 
[T]he essential act of the Party is to use conscious deception while retaining 
the firmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty. . . . To tell deliberate 
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lies while genuinely believing in them . . . all this is indispensably necessary” 
(quoted in Levada 2001: 17).  
The doublethink is essential to accommodate the attitudinal ambivalence of the 
economies of favours. The knowing smile—whether as a sign of recognition, 
misrecognition, or both— indicates some release from the grip of totalitarian 
ideologies, aimed at the transformation of human nature (Arendt 1973: 458). It 
becomes irrelevant whether people believed official ideological messages or not. 
Instead, the relation to the officialdom became based on intricate strategies of 
simulated support and on ‘nonofficial’ practices (Yurchak 1997: 162; see also 
Zinoviev’s novels). The doublethink develops into the double standards that imply the 
ability to hold contradictory views in private and in public and the capacity of 
switching between them smoothly, when applied to ‘us’ and ‘them,’ to oneself and to 
the Party leaders, to one’s personal circle and to society as a whole. Double standards 
continued to spread in the post-Soviet era.  
At the individual level, the whole system of deals made with the state, which 
was intrinsic to the Soviet arrangement, inevitably led to moral corruption, the 
acceptance of sham, the padding of figures, string pulling, bribery, and 
doublethink. These conditions were necessary if society and the economy were 
to function. The collapse of the Soviet system did not introduce anything 
fundamentally new; it only eliminated the social and institutional (punitive) 
regulators that had limited the effect of the corrupting mechanisms (Levada 
2001: 9).  
Post-Soviet surveys provide numerical evidence of the ambivalence of public 
opinion in Russia (see Levada Centre annual reports). Yet practicing double standards 
is no doubt a universal phenomenon, not restricted to the totalitarian doublethink or to 
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its late Soviet and post-Soviet reincarnations. The manipulative use of the formal rules 
and using them to one’s own personal advantage may be particularly strong in 
repressive systems but is not limited to them. This is illustrated by the studies of 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviour in the Middle East, Asian, Latin American and 
African resource-rich economies, as well as in the recent analyses of the 2008 sub-
prime crisis elsewhere (Sassen 2012; Puffer et al. 2013). In his recent book on talk 
and silence about corruption in the Pacific Islands, Peter Larmour observes that when 
he brings up the subject of corruption, peoples’ faces tend to ‘light up’ (Larmour 
2012). Bauman links ambivalence to modernity, and Sloterdijk associates modernity 
with a universal trend of diffuse cynicism and ironic treatment of ethics and of social 
conventions, “as if universal laws existed only for the stupid, while the fatally clever 
smile plays on the lips of those in the know” (Sloterdijk 1987: 3-4).   
 
Methodological experimentation 
  When I did my fieldwork in Russia in the 1990s and asked people to talk to 
me about blat – Russia’s economy of favours – they smiled knowingly but then 
almost universally responded, “Why ask me?” Reassured that I only want to know 
“what everybody knows,” most of my respondents were happy to discuss blat matters 
frankly, talking mostly about others, or about the way things used to be, but 
eventually also coming up with personal stories. Understanding  of the misrecognition 
game and the attitudinal ambivalence has informed my methodology of research on 
favours: speak about generic practice, not personal experience; let the experience 
trickle down through narrative; speak about others (neighbours, other firms, friends); 
speak about the past, and inquire about know-how that is no longer in use. It would 
seem that one cannot study societies’ open secrets by a straightforward tackle. 
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Approaching sensitive subjects requires an observant and patient researcher, keen on 
details and willing to take detours. Detours are in fact essential and are not without 
paradoxes. One should not look for it to find it; one should go at a distance to see 
closer; one should use the “rear mirror” to move ahead; and one should get out to see 
what is in. In other words, the most direct way of studying sensitive subjects is to 
study them indirectly. One of the side effects of researching economies of favours 
might be that one becomes unfit to participate in it: once its misrecognition game is 
recognised, it becomes impossible to play it, once its ambivalence is articulated, 
practical choice of position becomes inhibited. Reflection kills practice. 
Studying economies of favours allows one to assess the most profound 
features of societies through seemingly trivial aspects of everyday behaviour, but it 
requires methodologies for grasping ambivalence. Sensitivities displayed in people’s 
accounts and explanations of favours provide insights into their own view of the 
divisive nature of favours and the double standards surrounding them, as well as into 
relationships within their networks. An additional challenge for a researcher of 
economies of favours is to historicize their elusive meaning defined by period, place 
and context, including all varieties of collective identities. In the beginning of the 
1990s, it became possible to ask people to articulate their views on the Soviet past 
without constraint, just as in the 1950s, those who left the Soviet Union were able to 
describe their blat experience in the Harvard Interviewing Project. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union has made blat a matter of the past and thus enabled people to articulate 
it (Fitzpatrick 2000). Yet asking people about private matters, such as favours, is 
never in their comfort zone.   
Years of fieldwork in post-Soviet Russia has helped me to develop a ‘slow 
cooking’ methodology and assemble ethnographic evidence on hidden aspects of 
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informality, strategies of misrecognition, and ambivalent qualities of economies of 
favours alongside other qualitative research. I relied on people’s willingness to share 
their experiences and started framing the most interesting ones as case studies. When I 
was researching Russia’s Economy of Favours, it was a case of a doctor, Natalia, who 
was an effective blat broker, exploiting the system but also being exploited by it. Her 
story exemplified the experience of the inner workings the Soviet economy of favours 
at grassroots level. In How Russia Really Works, it was the story of a banker, Tatiana, 
that best illustrated the ambivalence of the business dynamics of the 1990s, with its 
criminality, unlawfulness and unfairness, on the one hand, and its functionality for the 
transition, on the other (2006). As I looked for a story to illustrate the profound 
changes that have taken place in Russia in 2000-2008, I knew it should be associated 
with the increased importance of the judiciary and Russia’s integration into the 
international legal order. I was particularly keen to explore gender aspects – the 
majority of judges are women – and their relevance to the analysis of the key feature 
of sistema. The first decade of the twenty-first century produced a ‘whistle-blowing’ 
trend among the Russian judiciary, with a number of judges speaking out about the 
fear they felt and the administrative pressure they had experienced. Several testified 
that, at a higher level, influence with judges and prosecutors can yield desired results 
in criminal, commercial, and civil trials, and that, even if unfavourable judgments are 
handed down, there are ways to ensure that they are not enforced. When judge Olga 
Kudeshkina was dismissed from her position as a judge in the Moscow City Court for 
her non-compliance with informal commands, she took her case to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and won.
8
 Her life story has become the case 
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 ECtHR ruling No 29492/05 Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009. For details see Judge Olga B. 
Kudeshkina’s speech, 1 March 2010, ‘Deeds not words: The present failings of judicial reform in 
Russia’, www.eu-russiacentre.org/eurc/judge-olga-kudeshkinas-speech.html.  
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study for Can Russia Modernise (2013), illustrating the constraints that turn a 
‘whistleblower’ of sistema defects into a ‘traitor.’9 
Theoretically, my method connects to the ‘obliquity’ approach, John Kay’s 
study of why our goals are best achieved indirectly (Kay 2011). Kay observes that the 
happiest people do not pursue happiness; the most profitable companies are not the 
most profit-oriented; and the wealthiest people are not the most materialistic. Grant 
pursues a similar argument in the context of give and take practices (Grant 2013). 
Following this line of thinking, I looked for evidence of informal power in unexpected 
places. Somewhat paradoxically, the evidence for the most ephemeral and secretive 
workings of informal power was found in most formal of sources – legal rulings in the 
public domain – and in most tangible way, the material culture of the Kremlin’s 
securitised communication network vertushka (Ledeneva 2013). 
In my interviews I have searched not only for signs of awareness of 
transgression but also for signs of recognition of things one does not need to spell out. 
Masked hostility – expressed through ribbing – towards the researcher ‘daring’ to 
expose sensitive matters is indicative of these tensions. The semi-taboos about 
economies of favours, the complicity to leave things unarticulated, the ambivalence in 
attitudes are all pointers to the potentially innovative research. Observing the near 
ubiquitous exchange of knowing smiles in everyday contexts has pointed me to the 
niches of informality. Such exchanges are the basis of normality and routine 
interaction that is so fundamental for the modus operandi in societies according to 
Goffman (Goffman 1971:7-14, Giddens 2009: 293). Smiling about blat has given me 
a prompt to look at other open secrets and their intricate relationship with power. 
Knowing smiles are an integral part of maintaining ambivalent attitudes toward the 
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 See the case of Edward Snowden. ‘Russia defies US with grant of year’s asylum for Snowden’. FT 
Europe, 2 August, 2013, p.1. See also (Assange 2013). 
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official discourse of power elites while allowing them to continue to stay in power. 
One is both forced and motivated to engage in the economies of favours, and to bridge 
the gaps between formal and informal constraints of the system. Such an arrangement 
makes one the insider of the system but also makes one complicit and fundamentally 
dependent on it. In the majority of countries, however, economies of favours up to 
now mostly have escaped dissection and analysis.  
A good starting point for an innovative take on economies of favours is paying 
attention to slang, jargon and language games surrounding them, and exploring the 
potential of Borat methodologies (Condee 2008). I argue that economies of favours – 
where they are developed and registered in vocabularies of informality
10
 – constitute 
the societies’ open secrets. One might think that an open secret is not a secret at all, 
since it concerns things that ‘everyone knows’, whether within a particular group or 
more widely in a society. This view would be a mistake, however, because open 
secrets are only partly open. Open secrets are secrets in the sense that they are 
excluded from formal or official discourse but they are open in the sense that they are 
familiar and referred to in idioms and language games, though these often require 
explanation for outsiders. Their ambivalence is a real and significant one. There is a 
tacit acceptance that what is known should remain unarticulated. Open secrets occupy 
areas of tension, where a public affirmation of knowledge would threaten other values 
or goods that those involved want to protect. This point is noted in Georg Simmel’s 
discussion of secrecy, which reveals its complexity and subtlety. Simmel defines 
secrecy as ‘consciously willed concealment’—open secrets are clearly still secrets 
according to this definition.  
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 Henig, D. and Macovetsky, N. CEELBAS Workshops on Vocabularies and 
Grammar of Informality, Oxford, March and May 2013. 
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As societies’ open secrets, economies of favour have great research potential 
in most societies. The ‘oblique’ methodology outlined above fits with the logic of 
triangulation – “attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and 
complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint” 
(Cohen and Manion 2000: 254). Qualitative data on economies of favours should 
ideally be supported by other methods of “cross-checking data from multiple sources 
to search for regularities in the research data” (O’Donoghue and Punch 2003:78). 
However there are inevitable obstacles to the study of ambivalence, whether 
substantive, functional or attitudinal. 
Quantitatively, the size of economies of favours is even harder to assess than 
that of non-quantifiable forms of corruption, such as nepotism, conflict of interest, 
hospitality (TI 2011). The subjectivity of value of favours, their cross-cultural 
incomparability makes it impossible to measure the size of economies of favours 
objectively. Rather, one could assess a spread of the phenomenon, following the 
methodology of measuring perception, as in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
11
 
It should also be possible to reveal the gap between the perception of others’ use of 
favours and self-reported experience of giving and receiving favours. Given that 
perceptions of favours are ambivalent and experience is misrecognized, risks of 
quantification can be mitigated by triangulation that gives a more detailed and 
balanced picture of the situation. Given cultural specificity of economies of favours – 
there are often no exact translations of related idioms, slang, or jargon from one 
language to another – qualitative research is essential to establish the facilitating 
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conditions, main gatekeepers, principles of inclusion and exclusion, multiplicity of 
norms, needs satisfied, degrees of obligation and codification, influence of kinship, 
tradition and religion, social inequality and other divisive narratives. The main 
challenge, however, is to create novel indicators for grasping ambivalence, 
misrecognition, doublethink, and double standards that could potentially be 
comparable across societies.  
 
Challenges of comparisons: the risks of studying ambivalent subjects  
Comparability of economies of favours can be seriously contested. Due to 
their substantive ambivalence, they are hard to study even within one setting 
(specificity, secretive nature, dependence on respondents). They are inscribed into 
formal frameworks – political and economic systems – which are themselves non-
comparable and rooted in different historical/social contexts. Due to their functional 
ambivalence, they both subvert and support political and economic systems, social 
norms and standards of sociability. Due to attitudinal ambivalence, the collected data 
may be difficult to interpret. Rather than following a coherent set of principles, 
provision of favours are in line with some, but contrary to the other, widely held 
norms and values, which causes the ambivalence with which it is regarded: it is 
usually condoned by some and condemned by others, and/or condoned and 
condemned by the same people, depending on a context. Thus, innovative approaches 
based on conceptual innovation, methodological experimentation, and comparative 
perspectives are required.
12
  There are also serious demands made on researchers of 
economies of favours who are exposed to a number of challenges outlined below: 
transference, paradigm bias and discipline of the discipline. 
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 The ambivalence of risks is grasped in the folk wisdom: ‘he who hesitates is lost’ and 
‘look before you leap’ or ‘between a rock and a hard place’.  
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Cultural nuances of one society can be too easily read into another; equally, 
economic functions can be attributed to others, resembling what Freud called the 
transference effect. With hindsight, I might have attributed to China what is not there 
in my comparison of Russian blat and Chinese guanxi.
13
 It is easy to lapse into a 
‘relationship bias’ or ‘economic bias’ while searching for the logic of economies of 
favours. The notion of functional ambivalence resolves this tension but creates other 
ones. Cultural norms and obligations of sociability are the informal constraints that 
constitute conditions under which favours are utilised. Favours are part and parcel of 
social relationships, yet they also can become ‘institutionalised’ under formal 
constraints, thus facilitating the systemic use of connections to procure favours. Such 
conditions are associated with the absence of the markets and the distorted role of 
money in socialist societies, but also more generally are shaped by the shortage of 
supply, dealt with through rationing or other forms of resource allocation (Kornai 
1979); the pressure of demand (regular, periodic, or life-cycle; family, friends, others 
and networking); the strength of social norms, customs, tradition, or collective action; 
as well as human ability to deal with double standards in psychologically defensive 
way (misrecognition game). The reasons for the emergence of economies of favours 
(survival, shortage, socially construed necessity) may not be the same as the reasons 
for their reproduction (vested interests), which accounts for the fundamental changes 
in the use of networks in the post-Soviet period in Russia and elsewhere. Changes in 
the role of blat in Russia and guanxi in China, for example, seem to highlight a 
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secondary literature on the subject. I have spoken to students from China and offered them to work on 
the subject. None of these worked until I have received help from a scholar of Chinese origin, with 
interest in guanxi and marginal, insider/outsider perspective, similar to mine. Eva Hoffman has 
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(Hoffman 2011). Her example has been inspirational for venturing an encyclopaedic project on 
informal practices around the world. 
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tendency for economies of favours to proliferate among elites in both regimes and to 
exclude ordinary people from the rights and opportunities that markets are supposed 
to have opened up (Ledeneva, 2008). Further challenges emerge with an expansion of 
comparisons between developing countries and industrialized democracies and an 
attempt to establish whether the role of economies of favours diminishes in the 
processes of democratisation, modernization, and globalisation. 
It was once assumed that when the communist centralized systems ceased to 
exist, there would not be a need for economies of favours, alternative currencies or an 
extensive use of networks. Markets would take care of functions that used to be 
performed by informal networks in planned economies, as prescribed by the 
Washington consensus paradigm, and democracies would consolidate, as prescribed 
by the transition paradigm (Stiglitz 1999; Carothers 2002). However, research shows 
that the use of networks not only has not diminished but has increased (Rose, 2001; 
Sik 1994). The legacy of socialism is often blamed, and the path-dependent behaviour 
is indeed part of the explanation (Mandel and Humphrey 2002). A further 
explanation, however, is the path-dependent paradigms and models, preoccupied with 
defects of post-socialism, market reforms and democracy. Such paradigms overlook 
the ‘working patterns’ of post-socialism – the problem-solving capacity of networks 
and their functional ambivalence driven by both sociability and rationality. The 
exigencies of the post-communist transition are compensated for by resort to 
networks; low levels of trust in state institutions and insufficiently developed 
impersonal systems placed emphasis on interpersonal trust. Tellingly, studies of 
economies of favours in transitional societies or emerging markets have helped to 
develop the postcommunist or postsocialist (as anthropologists refer to it) academic 
field, and also expanded into other thematic fields. Blat research has been relevant for 
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studying social capital and emerging markets, labour and consumer markets, 
entrepreneurship and marketing, trust, mobility and migration, shortages and survival 
strategies, barter and alternative currencies, informal and remittance economies, and 
informal institutions and democracy. Economies of favours have implications for 
many disciplines such as management studies (Puffer et al. 2013), informal 
governance (Christiansen 2012), legal anthropology (Donovan 2007); organisational 
studies (Yakubovich 2013); social media studies (Lonkila 2010, Morozov 2012) and 
cyber studies (Assange et al 2012), but the research into economies of favours 
requires interdisciplinary skills. 
An interdisciplinary approach is essential for understanding the workings of 
informal networks: for example, one has to grasp the history of blat, its political 
significance and the ideological nature of bargaining powers, the economic functions, 
social skills and divisions behind blat, as well as the ambivalence of the informal 
exchange of favours – not exactly an exchange of gifts but not one of commodities 
either.
14
 
The disciplinary methods do not provide for the bottom-up research of 
economies of favours and impose top-down limits, such as conceptualising blat as 
institution, blat as network, and blat as practice thus inferring huge differences in 
method, typology, and implications. All these perspectives are essential for the 
understanding of economies of favours: the more interdisciplinary the research is, the 
more nuanced it becomes. The nuances of economies of favours are so important that 
it requires almost a ‘clinical approach’ with Merton’s compassion but also 
detachment, with focus on the in-depth understanding of the case and its cultural 
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for country variations is its sectorial analysis, say, the use of favours in medical, 
educational sectors or in business. 
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context and also certain distance from it. A degree of marginality, being an insider but 
also an outsider of the studied societies, moving in and out of the field is essential for 
both the respondents and the researcher. Marginality can be an unintended 
consequence of the losing of one’s country (or the socialist system one believed in), 
one’s freedom, one’s job, or one’s status.  For a researcher, such losses are a find. 
‘Disaggregating’ concepts and specifying local practices, while being able to 
‘inscribe’ them back into the global knowledge; creating novel ways of recording, 
registering and measuring economies of favours, while being able to connect to the 
existing datasets and indicators; maintaining the cultural relativity of economies of 
favours, while introducing a comparative dimension – all require expertise in 
ambivalence – a healthy degree of schizophrenia, as it were.  
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